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Abstract 
This paper develops an analytical framework which structures the problem of whether, how 
and to what extent small producers in developing countries are disadvantaged by the 
increasing prevalence of food quality standards. Based on a literature review, the empirical 
evidence is structured and research gaps are identified. The paper finds that small and medium 
producers rarely comply without support from downstream actors. In case of well-educated 
and relatively wealthy farmers, forward integration is also found. No empirical support exists 
for the intuitively appealing hypothesis of a lower cost of compliance per unit of output for 
large producers. 
Keywords:   Quality Standards, International Trade, EUREPGAP, Certification, Small 
Farmers, Developing Countries, Cost of Compliance 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Papier wird ein Analyserahmen entwickelt, um die Möglichkeit und das Ausmaß 
der Benachteiligung von Kleinlandwirten in Entwicklungsländern durch die zunehmende 
Verbreitung von Qualitätsstandards für Produkte der Agrar- und Ernährungsindustrie zu 
strukturieren. In einer Literaturübersicht werden die Ergebnisse empirischer Studien ausge-
wertet und Forschungslücken identifiziert. Es wird gezeigt, dass Kleinlandwirte aufwändige 
Prozessstandards selten ohne die Unterstützung von Unternehmen auf nachgelagerten Stufen 
der Wertschöpfungskette implementieren. Die einleuchtende und weit verbreitete Hypothese, 
dass die Cost of Compliance per Produkteinheit für große Produzenten niedriger als für kleine 
Produzenten seien, wurde bisher empirisch nicht bestätigt.  




1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Structure of the Problem........................................................................................................ 3 
2.1  Individual Farm Characteristics, the Institutional Environment,  
and the Characteristics of the Standard.......................................................................... 5 
2.2  Costs and Benefits of Compliance ................................................................................. 6 
2.3 Analytical  Stages............................................................................................................ 8 
3. Empirical Evidence ............................................................................................................. 12 
3.1  Empirical Evidence on Independent Compliance of Small Producers......................... 13 
3.2  Empirical Evidence on Producers’ Compliance with Support from 
Downstream Actors...................................................................................................... 15 
3.3  Empirical Evidence on the Dependency Effects of Supported Compliance................ 17 
3.4  Empirical Evidence on How Problematic Exclusion Effects due to   
Non-compliance Are .................................................................................................... 17 
4. Conclusions and Future Research Needs ............................................................................ 18 
References................................................................................................................................ 20 
 
Working Paper 83 (2007); HU Berlin   Quality Standards for Food Products – A Particular Burden for Small Producers in Developing Countries?  1 
1. Introduction 
In the course of increasing and more differentiated demand for product quality, the nature of 
traded food products has changed from homogeneous to more heterogeneous products that 
have several quality characteristics: technical value, sensory quality, nutritional value and 
food safety, as well as the idealistic and psychological values of a product (Brockmeier, 1993, 
23; Wiegand, 1997, 43). While the technical value and sensory quality of a product can be 
assessed by the consumer, the other three quality characteristics cannot. Nutritional value and 
food safety are credence characteristics that can be assessed based on the final product by 
third parties. Most idealistic values can be classified as Potemkin attributes – characteristics 
which cannot be assessed based on the final good either by the consumer or by third parties 
(e.g. social, environmental, and animal health and welfare conditions in the production 
process) (Jahn et al. 2003; Tietzel and Weber, 1991). 
Akerlof (1970) was the first to show that markets fail if quality characteristics cannot be 
assessed by the consumer because of asymmetric information. Despite consumers’ 
willingness to pay for these characteristics, the market does not provide them since consumers 
are unable to identify or assess the particular quality of the product. To overcome this market 
inefficiency, an information flow must accompany the traditional product flow that can 
communicate each “traded” attribute of food. This is of particular importance in today’s highly 
fragmented global food markets, which are characterized by the increasing international 
separation of different parts of the value chain, such as production, processing, storing and 
transportation (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). Therefore, the amount of parallel information 
requirements increases at every level of the value chain (Theuvsen, 2003). Providing such 
parallel information flows causes transaction costs which may be reduced by the establish-
ment of adequate institutions. 
As a consequence, there is the tendency to move away from spot markets to higher degrees of 
vertical coordination (Pingali et al., 2005, 11; Buhr, 2003, 24; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, 111). 
As a result, management within the product chain changes, moving from management of 
individual firms that are trying to optimize their production processes towards total value 
chain management. The individual firm is thereby conceptualized as a part of the chain, 
interlinked with the production and exchange activities of other value chain participants 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2000; Mayoux, 2003). 
One aspect of the vertical coordination process is the increasing prevalence of standards, 
which enables the heterogeneous characteristics of a product, including process and 
traceability requirements, to be marketed whenever there is a willingness to pay for these 
characteristics. The guarantee of standards requires the collection, accumulation and 
communication of information along the food production chain (Theuvsen, 2005). This makes 
quality standards, which may be public as well as private sector-driven, an ideal instrument to 
overcome market inefficiencies and to reduce transaction costs. As such, standards define the 
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terms of membership of a chain and impose rules and conditions for participation. Gibbon and 
Ponte (2005, 163) underline the potential of standards to facilitate the inclusion of producers 
from developing countries in high-value chains, which are highly driven by consumers’ 
demand for quality. Standards provide retailers with the option to obtain products from 
independent producers instead of fully integrated production without any information on 
product quality. However, standards do modify the challenges producers face in the marketing 
process, and may affect different types of producers differently, depending on the nature of 
the standard as well as the capability of the producer to comply with its requirements. Hence, 
the introduction of standards potentially affects market shares, and may be accompanied by 
the marginalization and exclusion of producers. 
Besides the concern that small producers may be generally disadvantaged by institutional 
changes in the value chain (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005, 143; Pingali et al., 2005, 6), it is 
frequently asserted that small producers in developing countries have more difficulties coping 
with the increasing prevalence of standards. The reasons often mentioned for this tend to fall 
into two main categories: 
1.  The costs of compliance with a certain quality standard may be higher for small producers. 
This could result from the fixed cost component of complying with the standard, which 
would favour larger producers due to economies of scale (World Bank, 2005, 97). 
However, it could also be due to farm characteristics such as illiteracy of farmers, which 
makes information and documentation requirements more costly, or illiquidity, which 
may exclude farmers from the investments necessary to upgrade their farm to comply 
with the standard (Aloui and Kenny, 2005, 18; Jaffee and Henson, 2004, 15; Willems et 
al., 2005, 41). 
2.  The transaction costs involved in the compliance process for other chain participants such 
as exporters may be higher in the case of smaller farms, for example owing to higher 
communication costs and monitoring compliance costs. It may therefore be better for 
buyers to cooperate with larger farms (Pingali et al., 2005, 11; Swinnen, 2005, 46). 
As a result, small producers may be excluded from markets which require standards, and their 
economic situation may deteriorate (Humphrey et al., 2004, 69; Reardon et al., 2001, 12; 
Reardon et al., 2003, 29; World Bank, 2005, 3). This may especially be the case for private 
standards which include on-farm process certification, because of the sudden increase in the 
cost of compliance and the higher level of requirements with respect to information, 
communication and documentation involved in process certification. This is in contrast to 
most public product standards, which have evolved gradually over time and typically do not 
require sudden fundamental adjustments in farm management and on-farm certification. 
As an alternative to market exclusion, compliance and transaction costs could be reduced by 
ensuring a higher level of integration and coordination of farmers along the marketing chain.
1 
                                                           
1    For an example of the successful integration of small developing country farmers in high-value export 
marketing chains, see Minten et al. (2006). 
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In contrast to remaining a single chain segment, the participation of producers in the value 
chain may take different forms. According to Orden et al. (2004), there is a continuum of 
coordination with at one end the spot market and at the other vertical integration. Between 
these two extremes, various forms of vertical coordination can be found, such as contract 
farming, relation-based alliances, or equity-based alliances (Peterson et al., 2001). In a trading 
environment that is increasingly determined by standards, transaction and compliance costs 
could be reduced by vertical coordination, including support from a downstream actor in the 
marketing chain. Vertical coordination, however, potentially increases the dependency of 
small producers on downstream actors, which can weaken their position. 
In addition to costs, compliance with a standard may also bring benefits which may however 
be distributed unequally among farm types. Some sources mention productivity gains as a 
result of restructuring the farm when implementing the standard (World Bank, 2005, 71; 
Hatanaka et al., 2005, 362-363). If small farms are less efficient than larger ones, they may 
benefit more from such productivity gains. 
Unfortunately, however, the assessment of the effect of standards on small producers in 
developing countries only has a very thin empirical base and is largely based on plausibility 
considerations. Furthermore, no systematic overview of the factors that could determine the 
comparative disadvantage of small producers in coping with quality standards exists.  
This paper therefore has two main objectives. First, it seeks to develop an analytical 
framework that structures the problem whether, how, and to what extent small producers in 
developing countries are disadvantaged by the increasing prevalence of standards. This 
analytical framework is presented in Section 2 of the paper. Although it can be applied to 
compliance with food quality standards in general, certain aspects are only relevant for 
compliance with process standards, which are accompanied by third-party certification of 
agricultural producers. 
Second, the paper attempts to synthesize and structure the empirical evidence on the effects of 
quality standards on small producers in developing countries. Section 3 of the paper presents 
a literature review, which is organized according to the structure developed in Section 2. 
Finally, Section 4 draws some conclusions and identifies future research needs. 
2.  Structure of the Problem 
The overall hypothesis that small producers have a comparative disadvantage in the 
compliance process is based on their specific farm characteristics and their institutional 
environment. This is depicted in the analytical framework provided in Figure 1, which is 
divided vertically into three blocks. The left side depicts farm-individual characteristics of 
small producers, characteristics of the institutional environment and characteristics of the 
standard. These affect the costs and benefits of compliance, which are depicted in the second 
block of the figure and comprise the two main determinants of the compliance process. 
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Finally, the third block depicts the ways in which the costs and benefits of compliance may 
disadvantage small producers.  
Figure 1.   Framework for the Analysis of Disadvantages for Small Producers in 
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Source: own illustration. 
To enable this problem to be examined analytically, this part of the figure is structured into 
four analytical stages. The first stage explores whether small producers comply independently 
with the standard. The second shows how small producers may comply with the standard, but 
only with the support of a downstream actor in the marketing chain. The third stage discusses 
the effect that growing dependency of small producers on downstream actors could have, and 
Working Paper 83 (2007); HU Berlin   Quality Standards for Food Products – A Particular Burden for Small Producers in Developing Countries?  5 
the fourth stage investigates whether exclusion from high-quality standard markets would be 
problematic for small producers. 
The arrow on the right-hand side of Figure 1 indicates that compliance with a standard should 
not be seen as a one-off event, but rather as a process. For those producers who initially 
complied with the standard, questions at analytical stages 1 to 4 can be posed again with 
respect to maintenance, including upgrading because of potential updates of the standard. The 
only difference is that in case of first compliance, the necessary adjustments and costs 
involved are typically more significant.  
As long as the standard is economically relevant, those producers who do not comply with the 
standard at any point in time will continuously be confronted with the choice of whether to 
comply or not. Therefore, the questions at analytical stages 1 to 4 again apply. 
2.1 Individual Farm Characteristics, the Institutional Environment, and the 
Characteristics of the Standard 
Individual farm characteristics and the institutional environment are the basic determinants of 
the compliance process, and small farms tend to share particular characteristics. This supports 
the hypothesis that they are disadvantaged in terms of their compliance with standards. These 
unfavourable characteristics and their institutional environment relative to large farms are:  
–  Lower technological production level 
–  Less capital and land resources 
–  Less human capital 
–  Less ability to cope with risk 
–  Less ability to exploit economies of scale 
–  Less access to credits 
–  Less access to information 
–  Less output, urging downstream actors to cooperate with many small farms to receive large 
quantities 
In this definition, the term “small farmer” is defined in relative terms, which is the perspective 
chosen in this paper. However, small producers for markets which require standards may not 
necessarily be small (or even poor) in relation to farmers who produce for other markets, or 
subsistence producers. From a development point of view, this issue takes on special rele-
vance if the relatively small producers for the market which requires the standard are poor, or 
if they face the risk of falling into poverty through a deterioration of their economic situation. 
In addition, the characteristics of the standard determine whether small producers in deve-
loping countries are disadvantaged in the compliance process. For example, standards which 
require high levels of investment and access to capital or a high degree of documentation and 
the ability to read, write and keep records may be more difficult for small producers to fulfil 
than ensuring that the maximum residue levels of pesticides are not exceeded in the final 
product. 
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2.2 Costs and Benefits of Compliance 
Figure 1 shows that the characteristics listed above potentially affect small producers’ 
competitiveness through the costs and benefits of compliance. The costs of compliance can be 
defined as “all additional costs necessarily incurred […] in meeting the requirement to comply 
with a given standard in a given […] market” (World Bank, 2005, 67). 
The costs of compliance include all costs resulting from upgrading the production process as 
well as money spent to maintain the level of compliance. Table 1 shows that the costs of 
compliance for the producer can be grouped into five main categories:  
1.  costs for physical upgrading,  
2.  costs for human capital upgrading,  
3.  management costs,  
4.  the opportunity costs resulting from potentially lower yields,  
5.  social costs.  
In addition, recurrent and non-recurrent cost elements can be distinguished (Bennett et al., 
2000, 108).
2 Recurrent costs are defined as the cost difference between the annual cost of 
production before and after compliance, once the standard has been implemented.
3  Non-
recurrent costs cover all upgrading costs needed to reach the quality level required by the 
standard. These are to a large extent “sunk” costs once the standard has been implemented. 
These two terms are used here in contrast to fixed and variable costs, since part of the 
recurrent costs is not related to the production quantity and therefore does not vary.  
Table 1 additionally distinguishes between capital and labour costs, and indicates which of the 
cost components have to be borne by the producers, and which may alternatively be taken on 
by downstream value chain participants. In practice, producers are often supported in 
implementing a standard by the buyers of the products, who bear part of the costs of 
compliance. For example, “motivation of employees” requires capital as well as labour input. 
Theoretically, the capital requirements could be fully borne by any downstream actor. For the 
labour requirements, this may also hold for the non-recurrent component, for example through 
a downstream actor organizing an initial training workshop. For the recurrent labour 
requirement, which would involve the daily observation and motivation of farm workers, it 
seems plausible that at least part of the labour requirement must be borne at the farm level. 
The distinction as to whether compliance costs can, partially or fully, be borne by downstream 
actors is not clear-cut and depends on the structure of the value chain. Table 1 purely depicts 
the theoretically possible assumption of cost components. 
                                                           
2   In addition, Bennett et al. (2000, 106) distinguish between direct and indirect costs, while the World Bank 
(2005, 69) distinguishes between tangible and intangible costs. As these concepts are a matter of 
measurement rather than a conceptual distinction, we do not use them throughout this text. 
3   This distinction is not always unanimous. In reality, most standards evolve over time. Therefore, a typical 
compliance process would involve repeated upgrading as a response to updating of the standard and thus 
non-recurrent cost components. 
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Table 1.   Costs of Compliance at Producer Level 
Non-recurrent Recurrent  Categories Components 
Capital Labour  Capital  Labour 


















Training of employees   ●  ●  ●  ●  Human capital 
upgrading  Adaptation of employee structure  ●  ● -  - 
Motivation of employees   ●  ●  ●  ○ 
Own information  ●  ○  ●  ○ 
Conceptualization  ●  ● -  - 
Coordination with trading partners  ●  ○  ●  ○ 
Coordination with group members  ●  ○  ●  ○ 
Documentation -  -  ●  ● 
Management 
Analyses -  -  ●  ● 
More intermediate inputs  -  -  ●  ● 
More expensive intermediate inputs  -  -  ●  ● 
Higher variable 
production cost 
More labour  -  -  ●  ● 
Lower yields   -  x 
Social costs  x  x 
The cost component can be assumed by a higher-level actor: ● completely; ○ partly; x not. 
Source: own analysis. 
Like the costs of compliance, the benefits of compliance consist of several components and 
depend on farm-individual characteristics and the institutional environment. In addition, these 
benefits depend to a large extent on the further development of the prevalence of standards. 
Producers’ benefits from compliance include: 
–  less risk of being excluded from the market requiring the standard; 
–  the option to sell a larger quantity on the market requiring the standard;  
–  higher product prices; 
–  cost reduction through optimized input use/technological change; 
–  higher yields through optimized input use/technological change. 
Similar to the costs of compliance, the benefits of compliance can accrue to producers as well 
as to downstream actors. Who is able to capture which share of the benefits again depends on 
the structure of the value chain. 
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2.3 Analytical Stages 
Analytical Stage 1: Does the Producer Comply Independently? 
This sub-section explores under which circumstances small producers comply independently 
from support by downstream actors, whether as individual farmers or as farmer groups. Initial 
compliance with a standard can be separated into two steps; first the decision to adopt the 
standard, and second its implementation. The former is largely determined by the producer’s 
perceived costs and benefits. A rational producer will comply whenever the perceived benefits 
are larger than the perceived costs. This situation changes once the producer starts to 
implement the standard, when compliance is increasingly determined by the real costs and 
benefits, which may differ from the ones initially perceived. Since investments in standards 
are usually in the long term, the benefits also tend to appear in the long term, and future 
market developments are important determinants of benefits. 
Small producers share common features which tend to increase their costs of compliance. As 
displayed in Table 1, additional costs may arise from the physical upgrading process for 
human capital upgrading and management, because of lower yield, and in the form of social 
costs, and are discussed below in this order. 
The capital intensity of the technical upgrading may be highly problematic for small 
producers’ initial compliance. Since small farmers usually produce capital extensively at a 
lower technological level, the difference between this and the required technological level for 
compliance tends to be higher than for larger farms. As a consequence, substantial invest-
ments may be required to upgrade the farm. Taking into consideration the fact that small 
producers often have less own capital and less access to credit, costs thus tend to be higher 
than for larger producers. 
Producers need access to information for human capital upgrading and management activities. 
Consequently, the introduction of standards not only requires a greater information flow from 
the producer to the buyer, but also from the buyer to the producer. Since small producers 
often have less access to modern means of communication and a lower level of market 
integration and human capital than larger producers, it is difficult for them either to generate 
this information individually or to receive it externally. Fairman and Yapp (2004), as well as 
Henson and Heasman (1998), underline how small enterprises are dependent on externally 
generated information. The need for information covers three different levels. First, the initial 
awareness of the existence of the standard and its importance for the market. Second, in the 
decision process, the producer needs detailed knowledge on the requirements of the standards. 
And third, far-reaching extension and support may be necessary in the implementation 
process, especially if human capital levels are low. 
Other special features of small producers which impede initial compliance comprise their 
weak capacity to cope with temporary income losses and the missing option to test the 
standard only on part of their farm, which is often observed on larger farms. 
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Furthermore, the independent compliance of small producers is determined by factors other 
than considerations of the economic costs and benefits. These factors may include personal 
characteristics such as risk aversion or a preference for traditional production methods, or 
they could include institutional conditions (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Walgenbach and Beck, 
2003). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pronounce the importance of institutional isomorphism, 
which is defined as the tendency of participants in a sector to form homogeneous organiza-
tional structures. Since sectors form a homogeneous production network consisting of indi-
vidual producers, the decision to comply with a standard at an early stage of diffusion implies 
the decision to depart from the homogeneity of the network. Conversely, not to comply with a 
standard which is already widely diffused also involves leaving the homogeneity of the 
network. Rogers (2003) underlines that small producers acting in close social relations might 
experience high social costs in taking such a step.  
One important element of compliance with many process standards is the requirement of 
external farm certification. The certification process and the associated information, organiza-
tion, and documentation require a high level of on-farm management skills, which are often 
less prevalent on small than on large farms. In order to cope with these constraints, the 
certification of farmer groups is an alternative option to certifying producers independently. 
This implies that a group of farmers establishes an internal quality management system which 
is externally audited. In this case, the producer group is the holder of the certificate. 
Forming producer groups may reduce costs at various levels, and has three main implications. 
First, group certification implies that not each producer is audited externally; consequently the 
costs for the external audit per producer are lower. Second, the producer organization might 
function as a source of information for producers, who accordingly do not have to generate all 
information by themselves. The group can establish direct contact with the buyer and 
consequently develop an information flow from the buyer to the producer. Third, the external 
motivation for certification is much higher if producers are organized in a group which 
includes several members who have already been certified. Having said that, the 
implementation of an internal quality management system requires considerable management 
skills and produces high costs, to the extent that it is not clear at the outset that group 
certification is generally any more favourable for small farmers than individual certification. 
Analytical Stage 2: Does the Producer Comply with Support by a Downstream Actor? 
An alternative to complying independently with a standard is the compliance of a producer 
with support by a downstream actor in the supply chain, such as an exporter enterprise. This 
implies that the downstream actor bears part of the costs of compliance. The level of support 
can have different dimensions: 
1.  Low level of support: The downstream actor shoulders part of the costs of the information 
about the standard. Besides the information on the development of existing standards, this 
is of special relevance for the awareness of the existence of new standards. Since small 
producers often have limited access to information channels, they tend not to recognize 
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the necessity of compliance; this is rather noted by the downstream actor, who is more 
directly aware of importers’ requirements. 
2.  Medium level of support: In addition to information costs, the downstream actor also 
bears other management costs to support the producer in order to implement and manage 
the standard. This implies that the downstream actor might carry out and take on parts of 
the costs of human capital upgrading and management activities (e.g. developing internal 
audits and management plans for the compliance process, training farmers and workers, 
etc.). In the case of standards that involve a certification process, the downstream actor 
may shoulder the certification costs and also be the holder of the certificate. 
3.  High level of support: The downstream actor additionally carries out and bears the 
production process costs, which are relevant for compliance with a standard (e.g. carrying 
out all pesticide and fertilizer applications). 
Depending on the different levels of support from downstream actors, the producer faces 
different costs and benefits of compliance. These might favour a positive compliance process: 
not only do compliance costs decrease for the producer since they are partially borne by 
downstream actors, but also the risk of a misinvestment is partially assumed by the 
downstream actor. Furthermore, the producer might experience a direct benefit from 
compliance, since he or she could experience high external pressure and market exclusion in 
the case of non-compliance. 
From the perspective of the downstream actor, the phenomenon of support can be explained 
by two motives: first, small producers may become more dependent on the downstream actor, 
which may be attractive from the latter’s point of view. Second, downstream actors such as 
exporting companies are interested in a stable supply of compliant products. If this supply 
cannot be satisfied by larger producers alone, who should be more able to comply 
independently with a standard, companies have to revert to smaller producers who might 
neither see the necessity of implementing a standard without external support, nor be able to 
do so. However, in the long run the incentive for downstream actors to support small 
producers in compliance with the standards in order to ensure sufficient supply may diminish 
if larger producers apply the standard. In such cases, it may be more profitable for 
downstream actors to deal with larger suppliers because of the lower transaction costs 
involved in working with a few large producers instead of many small ones. 
Although compliance of a small producer with support from a downstream actor allows the 
producer to avoid market exclusion, it does involve the risk of becoming dependent on the 
supporter. This risk increases with the level of support small producers receive. 
The question whether this dependency is potentially problematic is discussed in analytical 
stage 3. If the producer does not receive any support and consequently does not comply with 
the standard, the subsequent question is whether exclusion from the market requiring the 
standard is problematic (analytical stage 4). 
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Analytical Stage 3: Is the Dependency Problematic? 
The previous section introduced the risk of dependency on the part of the producer, which 
goes hand in hand with the level of support received. This dependency may be problematic 
for small producers for three reasons. First, compared to a situation of independent compli-
ance, part of the value added may be transferred to downstream actors, which would cause the 
farm income of small producers to decline. 
Second, when farm work and management tasks are carried out by downstream actors, the 
producer loses knowledge about the relevant production processes, i.e. those which are 
necessary to comply with the standard, as well as those which are generally relevant for pro-
duction. He or she relinquishes control over production and management decisions, thus 
losing sovereignty. This could result in an “unlearning” process that could in the medium and 
long term deplete the farmer’s capacity to be autonomous and independent. Of course, such 
assistance could also have the opposite effect: external involvement in production and manage-
ment might also potentially enhance farmers’ knowledge and thus result in a learning process. 
Third, the downstream actor could make use of his or her strengthened market position, given 
the dependency of the producer (in an extreme case, this could be a fully monopsonistic 
position), and impose a product price that is below the competitive equilibrium. In case of 
standards which involve a certification process, the distribution of market power may hinge 
on whether the holder of the certificate is the farmer or the downstream actor. 
Analytical Stage 4: Is Market Exclusion Due to Non-compliance with Standards 
Problematic? 
It is evident that producers who fail to comply with a standard will be excluded from the 
market requiring this standard. Whether or not this is problematic depends on whether the 
possibility exists to produce for alternative markets for which compliance with the standard is 
not required; on whether production could be converted to other products; and on whether 
alternative employment opportunities exist. Alternative market access is determined by three 
different factors, as outlined below: 
Existence of public quality standards. Countries apply different levels of public quality 
standards, depending on their average income level and on their cultural background. 
Generally, high-income countries tend to have higher-level public standards than middle or 
low-income countries. Thus, producers in developing countries that are excluded from high-
standard export markets can still sell to markets requiring lower standards, which are mainly 
those of non-OECD countries or domestic markets. 
Enforcement of public quality standards. If small producers in developing countries are 
excluded from formal domestic markets because of public quality standards, they may choose 
instead to supply informal markets such as street markets and small retailers, where public 
quality standards are often not enforced (Reardon et al., 2003). 
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Prevalence of private quality standards. Voluntary standards lead to a higher degree of 
market segregation. Exclusion of small producers due to non-compliance only happens in 
those market segments that require the standard. This can be problematic if private standards 
are becoming quasi-mandatory in a market, since downstream actors may increasingly insist 
on compliance as an essential marketing premise (Will, 2003). This can be observed for 
example with the EUREPGAP standard for fresh fruit and vegetable imports to the EU 
(USAID, 2005). The EU market is still in a transition period: retailers in some EU Member 
States (e.g. the UK and the Scandinavian countries) require EUREPGAP as a precondition, 
whereas many retailers in other Member States such as Germany and France prefer to buy 
EUREPGAP-compliant produce, but are also prepared to buy non-certified products when no 
EUREPGAP produce is available. From a producer perspective, this means that EUREPGAP 
constitutes a clear marketing advantage, but non-certified producers do not yet face exclusion 
from the EU market as a whole. However, although there are no direct sanctions, not 
complying with EUREPGAP means not fulfilling buyers’ preferences and, from a producer 
perspective, implies potential market exclusion in the future. 
As long as sufficient alternatives to high-standard markets exist, producers which are not able 
to comply with high standards can serve these markets. In the long run, however, private as 
well as public standards are becoming increasingly relevant, even on the domestic markets of 
developing countries (Reardon et al., 2003; 2004). The same holds for eastern European 
countries and other non-OECD importers (Csáki et al., 2004). As a consequence, shrinking 
demand for non-compliant products could force prices down for these products. 
3. Empirical  Evidence 
In this section we review the empirical evidence in the literature to answer our basic research 
question as to whether standards represent a particular burden for small producers in 
developing countries.
4 This literature has expanded rapidly since the end of the 1990s, when 
the relevance of standards for international trade of agricultural and food products 
increasingly attracted the interest of researchers.  
To answer the research question, different strands of the empirical literature can be examined. 
Some analyses focus on the extent to which quality standards generally affect developing 
countries’ exports, without explicitly dealing with effects at the producer level. This strand of 
literature comprises econometric studies based on cross-sectional data. Most of the 
econometric models applied are based on the gravity equation (e.g. Otsuki et al., 2001; 
Jayasuriya et al., 2006). Alternatively, other empirical analyses apply equilibrium models to 
show that quality standards can have significant effects on developing countries’ exports (e.g. 
Maskus et al., [no date]; Ganslandt and Markusen, 2000; Peterson and Orden, 2006).  
                                                           
4   Empirical literature on the implementation of quality standards for food products in developing countries is 
dominated by research on the EUREPGAP standard, which therefore also dominates our literature review. 
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As this paper seeks to differentiate between producer groups within countries and sectors, we 
do not review the literature on the aggregate effect of standards. Instead, we focus on the part 
of the literature that can help us address the four questions raised during the analytical stages 
in Section 2. This part mainly consists of case studies based on sectoral surveys and, to a 
lesser extent, on farm surveys as well. We concentrate on the literature dealing explicitly with 
the effects of quality standards for food products on agricultural producers, and only 
incidentally draw upon the literature on organic and environmental standards, and standards 
for the manufacturing industry.  
Some of the case studies formed part of larger research projects such as the USAID and 
Michigan State University surveys, which were conducted in Mozambique (Bawden et al., 
2001), Zambia (Giovannucci et al., 2001), Malawi (Toomey et al., 2001) and Kenya (Harris et 
al., 2001). One year later, the results of a University of London project on the impact of 
standards on exports from Mediterranean countries were published. This project emphasized 
both the buyer’s and the producer’s perspective (Ababouch and Messaho, 2002; Yalcin et al., 
2002; Laajimi, 2002). In 2003, as the result of a World Bank research project, Wilson and 
Abiola (2003) published case studies for Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and 
Uganda. 
Nevertheless, all these surveys concentrate on a rather general impact of standards on agri-
cultural and food sectors. They do not present any farm-specific analysis, and the compliance 
process is largely neglected. However, most of the authors do assume that small producers 
tend to be more negatively affected by standards than larger farmers, without however 
providing any empirical evidence. 
This is not the case in a recent and comprehensive World Bank research project, “Food Safety 
and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries” 
(World Bank, 2005). This includes case studies that look at both the supply and the demand 
perspective. On the supply side, case studies were conducted for Kenya (Jaffee, 2003), 
Morocco (Aloui and Kenny, 2005), Senegal (Mbaye, 2005) and Thailand (Manarungsan et al., 
2005). These case studies include research at the farm level, but present little evidence on 
differentiation among producer groups. 
In addition to publications in the context of these large-scale research projects, various other 
case studies have been published over the last decade. In the following sub-section, we review 
the literature in detail according to the questions raised in the analytical stages of Section 2. 
Since empirical evidence is still scarce, we also review some papers which do not have a 
particular focus on developing countries. 
3.1 Empirical Evidence on Independent Compliance of Small Producers 
Papers with a particular focus on the compliance process, and on the question of which factors 
affect this process, are rare. Henson and Heasman (1998) develop a model of the compliance 
process with food safety standards based on empirical evidence from food manufacturers and 
retailers in the UK. As one of their major findings, they underline that the compliance process 
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differs for small and large firms. They state that small firms generally implement regulations 
later and are more likely to choose partial or non-compliance. Fairman and Yapp (2004) 
modify the Henson and Heasman model to adapt it for the particular compliance process of 
small enterprises in the UK with food safety standards. They stress the complete reliance of 
small business on external information, and note that the compliance process is externally 
driven. Walgenbach and Beck (2003) discuss the compliance process of enterprises in various 
industries with ISO 9000 in Germany, based on new institutional theory. One of their major 
findings is the identification of a willingness to comply even if compliance is not in the direct 
economic interest of the firm. The authors emphasize the driving force of sectoral 
isomorphism for the compliance decision, which is based on interest in cooperation and social 
acceptance. This underlines the perspective of the decision-maker, who not only focuses on 
processes within the firm, but also sees the firm as part of an institutional system. 
To the authors’ knowledge, only three surveys explicitly explore the compliance process and 
compliance strategies of producers in developing countries. Okello and Swinton (2005) 
compare the compliance process of a large and a small family farm with the EUREPGAP 
standard in a paired case study in the Kenyan bean sector. The paper is based on transaction 
cost economics, the principal agent theory and the principle of economies of scale. One of its 
major findings is the identification of different strategies on the part of both types of producer 
to respond to private standard requirements. While the larger producer chooses to become 
certified as an individual farmer, the paper identifies considerable potential for smaller 
producers to reduce the costs of compliance through group certification. The paper does not 
provide any empirical evidence of small producers being particularly disadvantaged regarding 
upgrading costs, but does produce evidence that smaller farms face higher recurrent costs.  
Chemnitz (2007) reports the results of a survey on the diffusion of the EUREPGAP standard 
in the Moroccan tomato sector, which includes a qualitative as well as a quantitative analysis. 
The paper explores the various factors that favour or impede certification based on innovation 
theory, new institutional theory, and the concept of economies of scale. Almost all Moroccan 
producers comply with the EUREPGAP standard independently from downstream actors. 
However, 22 out of the sample of 30 certified producers are vertically integrated into the 
value chain and control the processing and marketing of the raw product (whereas out of a 
sample of 33 non-certified producers, only 6 are vertically integrated). The ownership of the 
packing station may take two organizational forms, either individually or as a member of a 
cooperative. Two of the most important findings of the survey are that producers which are 
certified are in contact with their international buyers and experience external pressure from 
them, such as the threat of sourcing from other producers in case of non-compliance. The 
survey underlines the importance of vertical coordination for the compliance process of small 
producers. It also indicates that there is a medium to low correlation between the cost of 
compliance and farm size, suggesting that the “starting point” could well be more important 
than farm size.  
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In a study based on a similar methodological approach, Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006)
5 
analyse the compliance process with the EUREPGAP standard in the Peruvian mango sector. 
In the sample from this sector, all EUREPGAP-certified producers are engaged in contract 
farming or enjoy a higher order of vertical coordination. Only a few large farmers are certified 
independently, and all others rely on the support of export companies. The costs of 
compliance are found to range from 0.3% to 15.2% of the production value, and average 
3.8%. This shows that the costs of compliance can impose a considerable economic burden, 
and are strikingly variable. No significant relationship between farm size and the cost of 
compliance is found. 
3.2 Empirical Evidence on Producers’ Compliance with Support from 
Downstream Actors 
Fairman and Yapp (2004, 46) show for the UK market that smaller producers are unable to 
generate knowledge about consumer requirements. Hence, their compliance is mainly exter-
nally driven. Various case studies discussed in this section underline this finding for 
producers in developing countries, and point to the importance of downstream actors in 
supporting small producers in the compliance process. 
In a study on how supermarkets in Central America obtain fresh fruits and vegetables, 
Berdegué et al. (2005, 265) describe a centralized procurement system under which a super-
market chain establishes technical assistance and training programmes to support its suppliers 
in complying with higher standards. Jaffee and Masakure (2005, 327-330) provide evidence 
from Kenya where exporters of vegetables support small suppliers by providing inputs, 
credits and extension services, advice in the application of agrochemicals, and supervision. 
Manarungsan et al. (2005, 6, 42-45) outline that with tightening vertical coordination, 
asparagus producers in Thailand are supported by exporting companies, packing houses or 
cooperatives. This support takes the form of the provision of training, extension, technical 
support and inputs. Generally, however, these studies do not go into much detail regarding the 
level, means and nature of support from higher-level actors.  
Kleinwechter and Grethe (2006) underline the particular importance of downstream actors’ 
support for the compliance process of small producers in the Peruvian mango export sector. 
One of the main findings of the study is that all small producers in the survey complying with 
the EUREPGAP standard rely upon outside support to implement the standard. This becomes 
especially visible through the observation that, despite the large differences between certified 
producers in terms of socio-economic characteristics such as farm size, education or wealth, 
all certified producers show a high level of vertical coordination, either by contracts with 
downstream actors or by vertical integration. In no case do producers who still sell to 
intermediate traders without direct contact to exporter enterprises comply with the standard. 
Additionally, the study shows that support may include the supply of inputs, extension and 
credit, as well as the assumption of farm management tasks (organization, application of 
                                                           
5   This study is comprehensively documented in Kleinwechter (2005). 
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pesticides). This reveals that the enterprises play a strong role in providing producers with 
information on the standard and directly influence their decision-making process. Thereby the 
downstream actors partially cover compliance costs by ensuring partial or complete coverage 
of cost components. 
Finally, other studies mention the importance of contract farming for compliance with private 
standards (Reardon et al., 2004, 176; Swinnen, 2005, 4, 19; Pingali et al., 2005, 21; Minton et 
al., 2006, 2, 20; Swinnen and Maertens, 2006, 17). A case study from Madagascar (Minten et 
al., 2006) describes the success story of 10,000 small vegetable producers, who have bene-
fited from micro contracts combined with on-farm extension and supervision programmes in 
order to comply with the required quality. Key and Runsten (1999, 386) see contract farming 
as a possibility to overcome the information gap of small producers, and thus to improve their 
knowledge on their trading partners’ requirements. Swinnen and Maertens (2006, 10-13) 
show for various examples from Central European countries as well as from Mozambique, 
Kenya, Zambia and Latin America that farmers are increasingly engaged in contract farming 
and receive support in the form of credit, inputs, technical assistance and quality control.  
In summary, there are many examples of downstream actors helping small farmers to comply 
with quality standards, although no real generalizations can be made. According to Swinnen 
(2005, 47), empirical surveys show a mixed picture rather than a general exclusion of small 
producers. Similar conclusions are drawn by Berdegué et al. (2005, 265), who find that 70% 
of the suppliers for Hortifruti, a highly developed specialized retail fresh fruit and vegetable 
supplier in Costa Rica, are small farmers.  
By contrast, several papers describe examples of small farmers losing market share as a result 
of increasing quality standards. Humphrey et al. (2004, 69-70) describe the redistribution of 
market shares as a result of quality standards in the fruit and vegetable sector in Kenya. They 
underline that “own farm production” of downstream actors increased from 40% in 1998 to 
more than 60% in 2001. All interviewees stated that they had reduced their smallholder 
supply due to concerns expressed by supermarket buyers about product characteristics and 
product quality.  
Maertens (2006, 3-5) underlines these findings for the horticultural sector in Senegal. 
Structural changes include a shift from contract farming with small-scale producers to large-
scale vertically integrated farms owned by exporting companies. Some interview partners 
stated that they had shifted from 100% reliance on contract farming to 80% reliance on 
vertically integrated production.  
There is insufficient empirical evidence to provide a clear picture on whether small producers 
are more excluded or supported when it comes to complying with quality standards. In 
addition, it would be interesting to know more about the determining factors for downstream 
actors’ choice whether to support small producers or exclude them. 
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3.3 Empirical Evidence on the Dependency Effects of Supported Compliance 
Given that farmers are often supported by downstream actors, this section discusses whether 
this support may, beside its positive effects, have any negative effects on small producers. 
Unfortunately, few studies explicitly mention and analyse the possible dependency effects of 
supported compliance. 
In their analysis of contract farming and rural development in Latin America, Key and 
Runsten (1999, 381) outline the various problems involved in contract farming, including that 
smallholders can be extremely dependent on their contract partners. This is especially the case 
when contract farming goes hand in hand with decreasing diversification and the dependency 
on the provision of inputs, so that growers face limited exit options and lose bargaining power 
against downstream actors.  
Jaffee and Masakure (2005, 330) show that the interference of exporting companies with the 
production process on farms in Kenya’s vegetable export sector allows them to influence 
strongly key production decisions. Another aspect is highlighted by Kleinwechter and Grethe 
(2006), who describe how exporter enterprises in the Peruvian mango sector sometimes hold 
the EUREPGAP certificate. This might provide firms with monopsony power and allow them 
to pay producer prices below the competitive equilibrium. 
To establish the extent to which small agricultural producers face disadvantages through 
increased dependency on downstream actors, what these disadvantages look like and their 
severity, a detailed understanding of power and governance within the value chain requires 
further research. 
3.4 Empirical Evidence on How Problematic Exclusion Effects due to  
Non-compliance Are 
Several papers mention the exclusionary effects of food quality standards for smallproducers 
(e.g. Gibbon, 2003, 615; World Bank, 2005, xviif., 39, 97, 103, 112; Hatanaka et al., 2005, 
361-362, 366; Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005, 298-299; OECD, 2005, 56; Kleinwechter and 
Grethe, 2006, 14; Shepherd, 2005, 10; Swinnen, 2005, 45; Pingali et al., 2005, 2; Maertens, 
2006, 5). This section takes a closer look at how problematic exclusion really is. For this 
purpose, we examine on which specific markets does exclusion due to non-compliance play a 
role, and which alternative markets exist. 
Various surveys suggest that the export market is divided into three different standard levels: 
Scandinavia and the UK at the top, the remaining EU countries in the middle, and non-OECD 
countries at the bottom as low-standard markets (Aloui and Kenny, 2005, 16; Jaffee, 2003, 
16). Chemnitz (2007) explores the exclusionary effects on the Moroccan tomato export 
market. Exports to high-level countries are only possible with EUREPGAP certification, and 
for the UK only with even higher standards such as “Nature’s Choice” and “From Farm to 
Fork”. Exporters to medium-standard countries have not until now faced any sanctions or 
Working Paper 83 (2007); HU Berlin 18  Christine Chemnitz, Harald Grethe and Ulrich Kleinwechter 
pressure if they are not certified. However, all interviewed producers expect to encounter 
problems in marketing non-compliant products in the future.  
According to Berdegué et al. (2005) and Reardon (2005), food standards are becoming 
increasingly important for national markets in developing countries as well. This development 
is induced by the rapidly increasing importance of supermarkets in developing countries’ 
markets. Several case studies place particular focus on the restructuring of national and 
regional markets and describe this process in developing and transition countries (Reardon et 
al., 2003; 2004; Swinnen, 2005). Various authors observe a market segmentation in which 
smaller producers are selling to less demanding but also less profitable markets (Hatanaka et 
al., 2005, 361, 366; Manarungsan et al., 2005, 1). 
In summary, exclusion effects can be observed on many markets and, owing to the globally 
increasing demand for high-standard products, alternative markets are shrinking even in 
developing countries in the long run. This trend raises the question as to whether empirical 
evidence on poverty effects of market exclusion exists. 
Recent studies emphasize the diverse effects of standards on poverty (Humphrey et al. 2004; 
Minten et al., 2006; Maertens, 2006). Based on a simulation model, Humphrey et al. (2004) 
argue that a shift away from smallholder production may have a poverty-reducing impact due 
to increasing employment on large farms. Maertens supports this conclusion and provides 
empirical evidence. One of the major findings of her survey is that high-standard agricultural 
trade is “an engine of pro-poor growth” in the Senegalese French bean sector (Maertens, 
2006, 9). Increasing wage employment is found to provide income for the poorest households, 
while the reduction of contract farming concerns households which are relatively better off. 
Minten et al. (2006), on the other hand, provide evidence that 10,000 producers from the 
highlands of Madagascar have now entered the high-quality fruit and vegetable market of the 
EU, creating a new niche market. Small farmers who participate in this market have higher 
incomes and more income stability. In all three surveys, sectors have become increasingly 
competitive and have increased their international market share because they offer high-value 
production. This may be particularly important in interpreting the results by Maertens and 
Swinnen (2006), Maertens (2006) and Minten et al. (2006), who find a poverty-reducing 
effect of trade which is subject to high quality standards.  
4.  Conclusions and Future Research Needs 
There is widespread concern that small producers in developing countries are negatively 
affected by the increasing importance of quality standards on international as well as national 
markets. In this article, we develop a conceptual framework to analyse this concern. We 
distinguish four analytical questions: do small producers in developing countries comply with 
quality standards independently, whether as individual farmers or in farmer groups? If not, do 
farmers receive support with compliance from downstream actors in the value chain? If they 
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do, is the resulting dependency problematic? And finally, if farmers do not comply, is their 
market exclusion problematic? 
The concept of “small farmers” as applied in this paper and in several case studies is a relative 
one. Empirical evidence shows that so-called small farmers in developing countries producing 
for export markets may be neither small compared to producers for the domestic market, nor 
small in absolute terms. In addition, the properties which disadvantage farmers in compliance 
and which are often associated with “small farmers”, such as low production technology and 
efficiency as well as weak integration into the marketing chain, are only loosely related to 
physical farm size, especially when taking into consideration the small producers of the 
exporting sector.  
On a theoretical basis we show that small farmers could well have a comparative disadvan-
tage in complying with quality standards owing to their specific endowments, which hamper 
their ability to acquire information on the standard and to implement it. We structure the non-
recurrent and recurrent components of the costs of compliance involved in a standard, and 
show how the properties of small farmers may result in higher costs of compliance than for 
large farmers. In addition, from a downstream actor’s perspective, working with many small 
farmers instead of a few large ones may be less attractive owing to higher transaction costs. 
In contrast to the concerns resulting from theoretical and plausibility considerations, relatively 
little empirical evidence can be extracted from the literature. Few studies analyse the 
compliance process of small producers in any detail. The studies reviewed here hint that small 
and medium producers rarely comply without support from downstream actors. In the case of 
well-educated and relatively wealthy farmers, forward integration is also found, but there is 
no empirical support for the intuitively appealing hypothesis of lower cost of compliance per 
unit of output for large producers. This may be due to problems of measurement, for example 
owing to the assumption of part of the costs by downstream actors. This issue requires more 
detailed research. More empirical work is also needed with respect to the effect of group 
certification on the cost of compliance, which is considered to be a promising alternative for 
small producers in particular, but for which there is as yet no empirical data. 
Many case studies report that downstream actors such as exporters are supporting small 
farmers in the compliance process. This support can range anywhere between a low and a very 
high level, resulting in the downstream actor playing an important role in farm production and 
management. There is, however, little empirical evidence as to why downstream actors act in 
this fashion, and how this affects power and value-added distribution along the value chain. 
For some countries and sectors, there is some empirical evidence on the exclusion of small 
farmers from high-standard markets. Nevertheless, there is little evidence on how problematic 
such forms of exclusion are. Various alternatives could well exist, such as production for 
other markets, a shift to other products or wage employment in the high-standard production 
sector or elsewhere. Two of the studies reviewed here identify a strongly increasing level of 
wage employment as a result of the development of high-standard markets, which has a 
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positive effect on income distribution and poverty. Indeed, “small” contract farmers are 
excluded from export markets, yet they still constitute a more wealthy group than those who 
earn their wages on larger farms. Evidence is still too thin to draw any general conclusions, 
but the facts so far certainly do not suggest that high standards generally cause income 
distribution to deteriorate or that they increase poverty.  
In light of the limited empirical evidence, there is much scope for further empirical in-depth 
case studies. Extremely interesting aspects that should be examined are the motives of 
downstream actors in supporting small farmers, and how this impacts the position of small 
farmers in the value chain. As both compliance with a standard and vertical coordination are 
dynamic processes, one promising approach would be to build an analysis using panel data 
sets capable of reflecting developments over time. From a development policy perspective, it 
is especially interesting to identify the institutional and structural requirements that allow the 
poor, irrespective of whether they are small farmers or employed on larger farms, to benefit 
from the development of high-quality standards markets.  
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